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KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION STRATEGY
HELI WANG,1* SHAN ZHAO,2 and JINYU HE3
1 Strategy & Organization, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore
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2 Grenoble Ecole de Management, Grenoble, France
3 Department of Management, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology,
Hong Kong
Research summary: We argue that the extent to which a firm faces takeover threats affects
its knowledge structure. In particular, takeover threats may lead to managers’ reluctance to
adopt a strategy toward firm-specific knowledge accumulation because implementing this strategy
requires them to acquire specialized skills, which are at risk under takeover threats. Conversely,
takeover protection leads to an increase in firm-specific knowledge. Further, the relationship
between takeover protection and firm-specific knowledge is positively moderated by managerial
ownership, which helps align managerial interests with those of shareholders. But the relationship
is negatively moderated by managerial tenure, as long-tenured managers have already committed
to their firms. Using a differences-in-differences method with Delaware antitakeover rulings in the
mid-1990s as an exogenous shock, we found results supporting these arguments.
Managerial summary: We examined how changes in the Delaware antitakeover rulings in
mid-1990s affected the knowledge structure of firms incorporated in Delaware. We reasoned that
with a greater level of takeover protection, top managers of those firms incorporated in Delaware
felt higher job security, thus providing them stronger incentives to make strategic decisions toward
the development of firm-specific knowledge and to make corresponding human capital investments
in specialized skills. Empirically, firms incorporated in Delaware were found to have an increase in
the level of firm-specific knowledge in their knowledge structure after the mid-1990s. Furthermore,
our analysis suggests that the role of takeover protection on top manager incentives is particularly
salient when the managers are awarded with more company shares and when the managers have
shorter organizational tenure. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The classical agency theory considers takeover
threat as an external corporate governance mech-
anism that constrains managerial misconducts
(Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Accord-
ing to this view, an increase in takeover threat
can enhance the disciplining power of market for
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corporate control, and thus, reduce agency costs
(Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Rosett,
1990). Conversely, takeover protection likely leads
to greater agency cost. Empirically, some studies
have found evidence consistent with the agency
view (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009;
Bhagat and Jefferis, 1991; Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick, 2003). For example, Gompers et al. (2003)
and Bebchuk et al. (2009) documented a negative
relation between the number of antitakeover provi-
sions that a firm has in place and the market-based
measures of firm performance.
However, the classical agency view of market
for corporate control has been challenged by
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some other scholars (e.g., Hanley, 1992; Pontiff,
Shleifer, and Weisbach, 1990; Shleifer and Sum-
mers, 1988), who argue that takeovers may lead
to breach of implicit contracts between the target
firm and its stakeholders, which can hurt the firm’s
value creation in the long run. Such breach of
implicit contracts is often evidenced by managerial
turnover, pension plan expropriation, and down-
sizing of target employees after hostile takeovers
(e.g., Brockner, 1988; Hanley, 1992; Ippolito and
James, 1992; Pontiff et al., 1990). Along these
lines, Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) found a posi-
tive relationship between the presence of takeover
threat and managerial compensation. This suggests
that managers are compensated more when there
is less assurance of their job security, indicating
the additional cost borne by firm owners when the
implicit contract with managers is lacking. Also,
a more recent study by Kacperczyk (2009) found
that takeover threat is associated with managers’
short-term orientation in decision-making. The
implicit contracts argument implies that takeover
protection may benefit the firm since it helps
facilitate the establishment of implicit contracts
between the firm and its various stakeholders,
which is often critical for long-term value creation
for shareholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
The existence of the two contrasting views
motivates us to dig deeper into the fundamental
mechanisms through which takeover protection
may affect firm value creation. Following the
resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991;
Peteraf, 1993; Wenerfelt, 1984), we maintain that
the firm’s knowledge structure is a key strate-
gic variable linking takeover protection with firm
value. Furthermore, to reconcile the different views,
we posit that boundary conditions may exist for
takeover protection to generate value for the firm.
Based on these premises, this article aims to
fill two gaps in the literature. First, we examine
the effects of takeover protection through a new
lens, that is, the knowledge structure of the firm.
Mostly conducted in the area of finance, existing
studies on takeover protection often focus on
its impact on managers themselves or firm-level
financial outcomes, including, for example, man-
agerial ownership (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1998;
Davis, 1991), CEO dismissal (Faleye, 2007),
and firm financial performance (Bebchuk et al.,
2009; Gompers et al., 2003). What has been rel-
atively overlooked, however, is how the influence
of takeover on firm-manager relationship may
consequentially affect firm strategies with regard
to its critical resources such as knowledge base.
Given that a focal interest of strategic management
is firm resource positions (Barney, 1991; Peteraf,
1993; Wenerfelt, 1984) and that top managers play
important roles in accumulating and deploying
firm resources (Hambrick, 2005), it is critical
to understand how the threat of takeover, or the
absence of it, may affect top managers’ strategic
decision regarding firm resources. Only until
recently, some studies have started to look at how
takeover protection affects innovation outcomes
(e.g., Atanassov, 2013; Chemmanur and Tian,
2014; Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian,
2014). However, their focuses have been on
changes in the general quantity/quality of innova-
tive knowledge; and their empirical results are quite
mixed.1 The current study, in contrast, examines
how takeover protection affects changes in the
structure of innovative knowledge. In particular,
building on existing studies, this article examines
how an increase in takeover protection affects
a firm’s strategic shift toward the accumulation
of firm-specific (vis-à-vis general) knowledge
resources, through its influence on top managers’
job security and incentives.
Particularly, we argue that the accumulation
and deployment of firm-specific knowledge often
require the firm’s top managers to invest in cor-
responding specialized managerial skills. Takeover
threat increases the likelihood of a manager being
replaced, rendering his or her investment in special-
ized skills obsolete (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1998).
Therefore, when under the threat of takeover, top
managers with foresight may be unwilling to help
the firm to adopt a strategy toward the development
of a greater level of firm-specific knowledge assets.
On the contrary, if some mechanisms are in place to
mitigate this concern, managers will become more
willing to embrace a strategy based on firm-specific
knowledge assets.
Second, we take into consideration of the argu-
ments from both agency theory and implicit contract
perspectives, and provide a contingency view on the
role of market for corporate control. While there are
still ongoing debates between these two theoretical
perspectives, little effort has been made to reconcile
1 While Atanassov (2013) found that an increase in takeover
protection in negatively related to innovation, Chemmanur and
Tian (2014) found the opposite. Sapra et al. (2014), on the other
hand, found that there is a U-shaped relationship between the two.
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the different views. We posit in this article that these
two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Takeover protection may both bring benefits to the
firm by facilitating the establishment of implicit
contracts and reduce firm value by giving managers
greater discretion to act in a self-serving manner.
Thus, some basic alignment of interests between
managers and owners may serve as a scope con-
dition for takeover protection to generate desirable
strategic outcomes for the firm. In particular, we
argue that although takeover protection mitigates
managers’ concerns and leads to a strategic shift
toward the acquisition of firm-specific knowledge, it
may simultaneously weaken the disciplinary role of
market for corporate control (Jensen, 1993). There-
fore, when managerial interests are aligned with
those of the firm owners through incentive mecha-
nisms such as managerial ownership, top managers
are more motivated to acquire skills necessary for
implementing strategies based on firm-specific
knowledge.
In addition, managers’ incentives to adopt strate-
gies based on firm-specific knowledge assets may
also vary with their existing human capital invest-
ments in the firms. Therefore, we further exam-
ine the role of top manager’s organizational tenure
in influencing the effect of takeover protection
on firm strategy regarding knowledge assets. For
top managers who have longer tenure in their
firms, it is more likely that they have already
acquired specialized skills and have commitment to
their firms, which help facilitate a strategy toward
firm-specific knowledge accumulation. Thus, to
some extent, managerial tenure may be considered
as a substitute for takeover protection in provid-
ing managerial incentives to implement a strategy
based on firm-specific knowledge. Accordingly, we
expect that, in contrast to managerial stock own-
ership, managerial tenure in a firm would nega-
tively moderate the effect of takeover protection on
firm-specific knowledge.
To best capture these ideas, we examine the
hostile takeover context in the United States. In
particular, we investigate a setting that resembles
a natural experiment—Delaware rulings against
hostile takeovers in 1996, during which there
was an exogenous change in takeover protec-
tion for Delaware-incorporated firms but not for
firms incorporated elsewhere. This change pro-
vides an ideal opportunity to study the effect of
takeover protection on firms’ shifts of knowledge
accumulation strategy.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Firm-specific knowledge and managerial skills
investment
A firm’s knowledge assets are often considered to
be a critical resource for firm survival and prosper-
ity (Coff, 1997; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander,
1992). Knowledge assets are often classified into
two types: general and specific. General knowledge
is not exclusively applicable to one business setting
and is thus widely accessible by many firms.
Therefore, a firm’s economic gain from general
knowledge is often unsustainable in the long run.
In contrast, the value of firm-specific knowledge
assets varies with firm settings (Becker, 1975;
Williamson, 1985). Thus, firm-specific knowledge
assets cannot be transferred to other business
settings without a significant loss in value. This
gives competitive firms less incentive to imitate or
expropriate such assets (Dierickx and Cool, 1989;
Helfat, 1994; Pavitt, 1991). Even if rival firms are
motived to imitate firm-specific knowledge, it is
often more difficult to do so, as the rival firms
will have to obtain the firm-specific features and
routines on which the knowledge is established
(Helfat, 1994; Wang, He, and Mahoney, 2009).
Therefore, although knowledge assets in general
tend to diffuse across firms, compared with gen-
eral knowledge, firm-specific knowledge is more
likley to generate superior performance for the firm
(Barney, 1991; Ghemawat, 1986). Consistent with
this argument, some previous studies have found
that self-citations of a firm’s own patents, an indi-
cator of the level of firm-specificity of knowledge,
is associated with greater market value of the firm
(Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; Wang and Chen,
2010; Wang et al., 2009).
A strategy associated with a greater level of
firm-specific knowledge involves both the accumu-
lation and deployment of such knowledge, which
typically require top managers to exert a greater
level of firm-specific effort by developing and
utilizing the corresponding specialized managerial
skills. First, acquiring firm-specific knowledge
is often accompanied by local search based on a
firm’s existing knowledge stock (Rosenkopf and
Nerkar, 2001; Wang and Chen, 2010). A successful
local search, in turn, requires skills specialized
to each firm setting. Although top managers may
not need to acquire as much specialized technical
skills as R&D employees do, they still need to have
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 2393–2412 (2016)
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a good understanding of the knowledge structure
involved to not only “know the right questions
to ask his subordinates” but also know “how to
evaluate the answers” (Castanias and Helfat, 1991;
Katz, 1974).
Second, top managers’ investment in specialized
skills is needed not only in directing firm-specific
knowledge accumulation process, but also in gen-
erating various “services” from those knowledge
resources (Kor, Mahoney, and Michael, 2007; Pen-
rose, 1959). For example, Building on Penrose
(1959); Kor and Mahoney (2005) argue that the
effectiveness of firm R&D investment is affected by
managers’ skills in searching for superior opportu-
nity set for the firm’s knowledge assets. The more
firm-specific are the managers’ skills, the more pre-
cisely can the managers assess the likelihood of suc-
cess among multiple avenues of application of firm
knowledge assets. Accordingly, managers with spe-
cialized skills are better able to devote resources to
those avenues that are most likely to achieve success
(Kor and Mahoney, 2005). Similarly, in the context
of this article, we expect that specialized manage-
rial skills are critical in transforming firm-specific
knowledge into superior firm performance.
Third, implementing a strategy of accumulat-
ing and deploying firm-specific knowledge is often
associated with a greater need for top managers to
build close relations with key technical employees,
whose technical skills are essential for the success
of implementing a strategy based on firm-specific
knowledge. Good manager-employee relations help
obtain the mutual understanding and trust necessary
to motivate those employees to cooperate in suc-
cessfully implementing the firm’s strategies (Wang
et al., 2009). Relationship asset itself is likely to
be specialized (Coffee, 1986; Williamson, 1985), as
developing tacit and intimate knowledge about team
members involves managerial experiences that are
team-specific in time and place (Kor, 2003; Kor and
Mahoney, 2005).
In sum, when a firm accumulates and deploys
firm-specific knowledge assets, the complementary
managerial skills required are also likely to increase
in their specificity. Such skills are more valuable
in the context of a particular firm than in any
other firms, and thus, distinct from generic man-
agerial skills and industry-related skills (Becker,
1964; Castanias and Helfat, 1991). Accordingly,
managerial incentives and actions to acquire such
skills can be a key to the success of a strategy based
on firm-specific knowledge assets.
Takeover threat and the knowledge
accumulation strategy of a firm
Similar to other types of firm-specific investments,
such as employees’ firm-specific skills or human
capital, top managers’ specialized skills are imper-
fectly redeployable or valued less in the external
labor market than within the firm (Becker, 1975;
Williamson, 1985). A critical concern about the
value of investing in such firm-specific managerial
skills may surface as managers are ex ante more
willing to acquire general skills to make themselves
more mobile in the external labor market. Such a
concern may easily intensify when the managers
face a high level of job insecurity.
A typical market mechanism that may jea-
pordize managers’ job security is the threat of
hostile takeover. According to previous studies
(e.g., Agrawal and Walking, 1994; Martin and
McConnell, 1991), over 60 percent of the target
firms’ CEOs lost their jobs over a three-year
period after the takeover. Moreover, CEOs of target
firms who lost their jobs generally failed to find
another senior executive position in any public
corporation within three years after the bid. Hence,
top managers have a reason to fear the loss of
the value of their skills in the event of takeover,
especially if the skills are specialized to individual
firms. Moreover, while contracting between the
managers and shareholders often allows managers
some rents to compensate their investments in
specialized skills, the threat of takeover interferes
with such contracting and reduces the reliability
of shareholder assurances. As a result, managerial
investment in specialized skills has greater poten-
tial of losing its value when takeover protection is
weaker (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
Therefore, managers who are subject to high
takeover threats may decide to prevent the firm from
pursuing the strategy toward more firm-specific
knowledge, in which case their personal invest-
ments in specialized skills are required to increase
accordingly. Instead, they would rather adopt a firm
strategy of accumulating a higher level of general
knowledge assets, even though it may not be in the
best interest of shareholders. In this case, gover-
nance provisions that support and protect managers
should be in place in order for top managers to
be rest assured in investing in firm-specific human
capital (Knoeber, 1986; Lambert and Larcker,
1985). Takeover protection can be considered such
a provision. When there is an increase in takeover
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 2393–2412 (2016)
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protection, the managers will be more assured of
the value of their specific investments, and as a
result, they will be more likely to adopt a firm-level
strategy based on a higher level of firm-specific
knowledge. And, such a strategic shift will be
reflected on the firm’s knowledge structure and
resource configuration. We thus propose:
Hypothesis 1: With an increase in takeover pro-
tection, a firm is more likely to experience an
increase in the level of firm-specific knowledge
assets.
The moderating role of managerial ownership
We have just argued that takeover protection
increases the managerial incentive to acquire
specialized skills, leading to a firm’s strategic shift
toward a greater emphasis on firm-specific knowl-
edge. However, increased job security may also
give managers greater discretion to pursue other
personal agendas (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Shen and Cho, 2005), which may divert some
of the managerial attention and effort away from
acquiring necessary skills, including specialized
ones. For example, Jensen (1993) argues that in the
absence of takeover threats, managers may not have
a strong incentive to engage in value-enhancing
activities. Therefore, although takeover protection
reduces managers’ concerns about losing the value
of their specialized skills, it may also decrease their
incentive to exert efforts to acquire such skills in the
first place, deterring the managers from making the
necessary strategic shift toward a greater emphasis
on firm-specific knowledge.
Therefore, the challenge is to make managers less
concerned about losing the value of their specialized
investments by having antitakeover devices, but at
the same time to constrain their incentives to pur-
sue their self-interests at the shareholders’ expense.
One solution is to directly link managers’ invest-
ments in specialized skills to rent appropriation by
granting them stock ownership. From the agency
viewpoint, managerial ownership serves as a form
of interest alignment between managers and own-
ers because managers’ personal gains are tied to the
economic value of the firm. Equity ownership may
prevent managers from engaging in self-interested
agency behavior, such as shirking in exerting effort
to acquire specialized skills (Demsetz and Lehn,
1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Also, from the
perspective of property rights (e.g., Demsetz, 1967;
Libecap, 1989), equity ownership rights represent
residual rights of control, which can give man-
agers some bargaining power with respect to the
distribution of rents (Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Hart and Moore, 1990). With the increased abil-
ity to appropriate the returns from their investments
in specialized skills, managers will be more con-
vinced to invest in such skills (Castanias and Helfat,
1991, 2001). As a result, they are more likely to
direct the firm toward accumulating a higher level
of firm-specific knowledge assets.
Therefore, although an increase in takeover
protection is expected to increase the likelihood
of a firm’s strategic shift toward accumulating
more firm-specific (vis-à-vis general) knowledge,
this tendency is influenced by the extent to which
top managers’ interests are aligned with those of
shareholders. With an increase in management
ownership, the increased takeover protection is bet-
ter able to induce managers to acquire specialized
skills and to change the firm’s strategic orientation
successfully.
Hypothesis 2: As top managers’ stock ownership
increases, the effect of takeover protection on a
firm’s level of firm-specific knowledge assets will
become stronger.
The moderating role of organizational tenure
of top managers
Job security provided by an increase in takeover
protection may give a firm’s top managers stronger
incentive to invest in specialized skills. However, at
a certain point in time, top managers may vary in
the level of firm-specific skills they already possess
and the commitments to their firms. We argue below
that for those top managers who for some other
reasons already acquired a substantial amount of
specialized skills, the motivating role of takeover
protection may become weaker.
A key source of specialized skills acquisition
is often considered to be associated with top
managers’ tenure in a firm (Henderson, Miller,
and Hambrick, 2006; Kor and Mahoney, 2005;
Simsek, 2007; Souder, Simsek, and Johnson,
2012). Managers with long tenure in a firm have
rich experiences of the firm’s unique organizational
routines as well as tacit knowledge of existing
firm-level resources and capabilities and their
rent-generating potentials (Kor and Mahoney,
2005). Moreover, managers with long tenure in
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 2393–2412 (2016)
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a firm are likely to have already built strong, or
at least, mutually acceptable, relationships with
the key employees, which provide necessary
motivations for the employees to cooperate in
implementing a new strategy, especially if the
strategy is based on firm-specific knowledge.
Thus, long-tenured managers would have already
acquired much of the specialized skills necessary
to form the base of a strategy toward develop-
ing firm-specific knowledge. In contrast, for top
managers who have relatively short tenure in a
firm, they lack the firm-specific experiences and
tacit knowledge necessary to implement a strategy
toward firm-specific knowledge accumulation
(Lazear, 2009). Moreover, as relationships are often
established and tested over time, such managers are
also less likely to have close relationships with the
key employees. As developing firm-specific skills
and building relationships with employees will
have to be done from anew, the cost of doing so for
managers with short tenure would be much higher
than that for long-tenured managers, who already
have certain level of such skills and relationships.
In order for short-tenured managers to acquire
specialized managerial skills, they must find some
additional incentives to justify the value of their
investment in such skills.
Therefore, the job security provided by takeover
protection should matter more to short-tenured
managers than to long-tenured managers in that top
managers with relatively long organizational tenure
are already committed to their firms, and would
be more willing implement such a strategy even
in the absence of takeover protection. Thus, man-
agerial tenure can to a certain extent be considered
as a substitute for takeover protection in provid-
ing managerial incentives. Accordingly, we expect
that, in contrast to managerial stock ownership,
managerial tenure negatively moderate the effect
of takeover protection on the level of firm-specific
knowledge.
Hypothesis 3: As the organizational tenure of top
managers increases, the effect of takeover pro-
tection on a firm’s level of firm-specific knowl-
edge assets will become weaker.
SAMPLE AND METHODS
Our theory highlights the role of takeover pro-
tection in mitigating top managers’ concern over
their personal risk if they direct the firm’s strategy
toward accumulating more firm-specific (vis-à-vis
general) knowledge assets. One way of testing
this prediction would be to look at antitakeover
provisions that firms typically adopt, including,
for example, poison pills, staggered boards, and
so on, and then examine the relationship between
the extent to which firms adopt these provisions
and the level of firm-specific knowledge. Previous
studies have adopted such approaches to examine
the relationship between antitakeover provisions
and some firm-level variables such as manage-
rial compensation (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1998;
Davis, 1991), firm financial performance (Bebchuk
et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003), CEO dismissal
(Faleye, 2007), and R&D intensity (O’Connor and
Rafferty, 2012). The drawback of such an approach
is that the adoption of antitakeover provisions is
likely to be endogenous. Specifically, the relation-
ship between takeover protection and various firm
characteristics is subject to the problem of reverse
causality—the relationship may be significant not
because antitakeover provisions affect firm char-
acteristics, but because these firm characteristics
affect the adoption of antitakeover provisions.
This endogeneity problem may, to a cer-
tain extent, be addressed by some econometric
approaches such as firm fixed effects (when using
panel data) and instrumental variables. However,
such approaches have their own limitations,2
which prompted us to use a natural experiment
that can effectively mitigate endogeneity bias
(Wooldridge, 2002). Specifically, the empirical
setting of the present article is around the period
of the “third-generation” antitakeover legislation in
the United States in the mid-1990s.
Before the mid-1990s, Delaware’s legal system
had been relatively friendly to takeovers. How-
ever, several Delaware law cases in the mid-1990s,
namely, Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Younkers
(1994), Unitrin Inc. v. American General Corp.
(1995), Moore v. Wallace Computer (1995), and
US Surgical v. Circon (1996), led to a significant
takeover regime shift.3 Specifically, The Younkers,
Wallace, and Circon (YWC) cases legitimized the
2 For example, firm fixed effects estimations eliminate firm-level
heterogeneity, and it is not suitable when error terms are corre-
lated; the effectiveness of an instrumental variable approach, on
the other hand, is constrained by the quality of the instrumental
variables chosen, which are notoriously difficult to find.
3 Please refer to Subramanian (2004) for a more detailed
discussion.
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use of poison pills in conjunction with a stag-
gered board for firms incorporated in Delaware.
Poison pills are a typically adopted takeover defense
that dilute the share ownership of the acquirer by
enabling the target firms’ existing shareholders to
purchase shares at a discount. A staggered board
restricts the replacement of a firm’s directors to a
certain fraction in a year. This provision makes tak-
ing control of a firm difficult for a raider because
the raider cannot immediately remove incumbent
directors, who may, in the meantime, adopt policies
that can harm the raider’s wealth. The Unitrin rul-
ing further expanded the circumstances under which
a hostile bid was considered a threat and relaxed
the judicial scrutiny in the proportionality review
(Gilson, 2001). As a result, while the other three
cases mainly apply to Delaware firms with stag-
gered board, Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling on
Unitrin (decided in January 1995) more broadly
affected all Delaware firms. As Subramanian (2004)
noted, “at the same time that the YWC trilogy was
solidifying Just Say No for the majority of pub-
lic corporations that have staggered boards, Unitrin
was strengthening the Just Say No defense for com-
panies more generally.”
Since antitakeover laws are typically supported
by a small number of firms rather than by large
coalitions (Romano, 1987), these legal changes
should be regarded as exogenous events for most
firms, and thus, can be used as natural experiments
in which the corporate governance environment
is exogenously altered for firms incorporated in
the legislated states. Another benefit of our focus
on Delaware’s legal shift in takeover is the wide
scope of its influence on the U.S. economy. Many
U.S. firms (57% in our sample) are incorporated
in Delaware, and all Delaware-incorporated firms
are affected by the legal change regardless of their
specific locations of operations.4
Data
We formed our sample from the intersection
of (1) the Compustat annual industrial file and
Execucomp database, (2) the NBER patents file
(Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001), (3) IRRC (now
RiskMetric) database, and (4) Compact Disclosure
4 Note that firms seldom change their states of incorporation.
In fact, only one firm in our sample changed its Delaware
incorporation. Therefore, there is not a concern for endogeneity
regarding the state of incorporation in our study.
database. The sample period is from 1992 to 1999.
In keeping with prior studies (e.g., Kacperczyk,
2009), we treated 1996 as the first year following
the legislation. We used an eight-year window
to compare the effects. Thus, the sample period
covers four years before and after the legislation
event.
We began our sample selection from firms in
manufacturing industries (four-digit Standard
Industrial Classification [SIC] codes from 2000
to 3999) in Compustat. This selection enabled
us to construct a sample of firms that share
some common characteristics in terms of their
knowledge accumulation processes, but provided
sufficient variation in terms of the level of knowl-
edge specificity. We then merged the data with
the NBER patents file assembled by Hall et al.
(2001). The file, which is based on the patents
filed by U.S. firms with the U.S. Patent Office,
contains rich information on patents and citations.
Data on the historical state of incorporation were
obtained from the IRRC database. Managerial
ownership data were collected from Compact
Disclosure, which contains extensive corporate
governance data extracted from the annual reports,
10Ks, and proxy statements. Execucomp provides
data on top managers’ organizational tenure and
stock options. After merging all the datasets,
we obtained a base sample of an unbalanced
panel containing 307 firms and 1,396 firm-year
observations.
Measurements
Our measures of the level of firm-specific knowl-
edge were constructed using patents and their
citations. Patent citations provide direct evidence
of the path of knowledge flow and spillovers
because each patent normally identifies several oth-
ers as constituting the state-of-the-art technology
on which it is built. The data enable the tabula-
tion of both backward citation (the previous patents
that a focal patent cites) and forward citation (the
patents that subsequently cite a focal patent). Dis-
tinguishing whether the citations are made within
the same firm vis-à-vis by other firms is also
possible.
Previous research has used patent citations to
address the questions on spatial diffusion (Jaffe,
Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993), international
knowledge flows (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999), and
spillovers from public research (Jaffe and Lerner,
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2001). Firm-specific knowledge often results from
searching and accumulating new knowledge on top
of a firm’s established knowledge base (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1989; Teece, 1986).5 If patents represent
knowledge creation, and patent citations represent
knowledge flows, then the frequency with which
a firm’s existing patents cite its own previous
patents indicates the degree to which the firm’s
new knowledge is built on its own knowledge base.
The higher the level of internal accumulation is,
the more likely that the firm’s knowledge assets are
firm specific. This logic supports the construction
of a measure of firm-specific knowledge assets
using patent citations. Accordingly, we build on
previous studies (Hall et al., 2005; Wang and Chen,
2010; Wang et al., 2009) to generate two proxies
for the level of firm-specific knowledge as follows:
Firm-specific Knowledge 1 = Share of backward self-citations (over total citations)madeby
the focal firm × the extent to which these self-cited patents are subsequently cited by the focal firm6
Firm-specific Knowledge 2 = Number of backward self-citations made (adjusted by
the number of employees) × the extent to which these self-cited patents are subsequently cited
by the focal firm
The two measures capture two dimensions of
firm-specific knowledge. Whereas the first dimen-
sion is about the degree of firm specificity in a firm’s
knowledge assets, the second is about the absolute
level of firm-specific knowledge in a firm. Specifi-
cally, the first measure is the share of self-citations
made, calculated based on counting all citations
made in a firm’s new patents in a certain year that
cited the firm’s own previous patents then dividing
this number by the total number of citations made
in all of the firm’s new patents in that year. The
second proxy is a count measure, calculated as the
5 Some recent research in corporate governance has also applied
patent citation patterns to measure firm-specific investments.
For example, Kale, Kedia, and Williams (2011) use cita-
tions by customers and suppliers to construct measures of
relationship-specific investments between a firm and its major
stakeholders. Bena and Li (2012) use patent cross-citations
between bidders and acquirers to measure specific investment
between merger partners.
6 To facilitate presentation, in the empirical analyses, we further
scale the share-based measure of firm-specific knowledge by
multiplication of 100.
number of prior self-citations made (adjusted by the
number of employees). We further performed a log-
arithm transformation of the count measure, given
its apparent skewness. Both measures are further
adjusted by a weight, the extent to which backward
self-cited patents are subsequently cited by the focal
firm, which is the fraction of the total forward cita-
tions of these self-cited patents that are generated
by the focal firm (vs. by other firms). The weight
is added to address the concern that, “even though
a firm cites its own previous patents, if these pre-
vious patents are also widely cited by other firms
(which makes the weight rather small), the degree
of firm-specificity in knowledge as measured by the
count of self-citations made should be discounted”
(Wang et al., 2009: 929).
To elaborate these measures further, suppose a
firm has 10 patents in the focal year and that these
patents have made 50 backward citations, 15 of
which are the firms’ own patents (35 are external
patents of other firms). Moreover, forward in time
from the focal year, these 15 self-cited patents
are cited by 80 patents, 20 of which belong to
the focal firm (60 are external patents). Then, a
simple share-based measure of firm-specific knowl-
edge for that year would be 15/50= 0.3, and the
count-based measure would be 15. After the weight
(20/80= 0.25) is incorporated, the share-based
measure becomes 0.3× 0.25= 0.075,7 and the
count-based measure becomes 15× 0.25= 3.75.
Public firms in the United States are required
to disclose the stock ownership of all officers and
directors (both in amount and in fraction of total
common shares) in their proxy statements. Follow-
ing prior studies (e.g., Anderson and Lee, 1997),
7 With multiplication of 100, the unweighted share-based measure
becomes 30 and weighted measure becomes 7.5.
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we obtained this information from Compact Disclo-
sure and used the fraction number (in percentage) of
shareholding by all officers and directors to measure
managerial ownership. Execucomp database doc-
uments the number of years for which a CEO has
joined a firm, which was used to measure CEO’s
organizational tenure.
Control variables
In keeping with prior research, we controlled for
the effects of other possible determinants of the
firm’s knowledge accumulation strategy, includ-
ing firm cash holdings, performance relative to
aspirations, financial leverage, return on assets,
market to book ratio, R&D intensity, firm age, firm
size, and managerial options. Firms may decide
whether to make a strategic shift in their knowledge
search based on the available level of slack or cash
holdings (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2007).
Similarly, some firms’ knowledge accumulation
decision may be influenced by financial leverage
or the extent to which they are exposed to financial
distress (Ketchen and Palmer, 1999; March and
Shapira, 1987). According to the behavioral theory
of the firm, aspiration levels and firm performance
in general may also influence firms’ knowledge
search and accumulation strategy (Cyert and
March, 1963; Greve, 2007; Levinthal and March,
1981). In addition, managerial options holding
may influence top managers’ risk preferences
(e.g., Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and thus,
incentives to adopt a strategy toward firm-specific
knowledge accumulation.
Firm cash holdings was measured by cash and
short-term investments divided by total assets.
Financial leverage was the book value of debt
divided by total assets. We used return on assets
(earnings before interest and taxes over total assets)
to measure firm profitability. Financial perfor-
mance was measured by market to book ratio, or
the market value of equity plus total assets minus the
book value of equity all divided by total assets.R&D
intensity was measured by the R&D expenditure
divided by total assets. We extracted firm age data
from Compustat. Firm size was proxied by the nat-
ural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. We followed
Levinthal and March (1981) and Lant (1992) to
model aspiration as a function of the exponentially
weighted moving average of a firm’s past perfor-
mance. In particular, a firm’s current aspiration level
(at time t) was calculated as the weighted average
of the firm’s performance and its aspiration level
in the previous period (at t – 1). And performance
relative to aspiration is then the difference between
the performance at this period and the current
aspiration level. Following Fenn and Liang (2001),
we calculate managerial options as the sum of the
number of unexercisable options and the number
of exercisable options held at the year end by all
executives listed at Execucomp database divided
by the number of common shares outstanding
(multiplied by 100). In addition, we also included
firm and year dummy variables in all models.
Empirical analysis
We tested the hypotheses using a differences-in-
differences (DD) methodology, which is commonly
used in labor economics.8 The DD approach com-
pares the effect of a policy (antitakeover leg-
islation in the present study) on a group that
is affected by the policy (Delaware-incorporated
firms) with that on a group that is unaffected
(non-Delaware-incorporated firms). Suppose we
want to estimate the effect of a policy on the treat-
ment group (denoted by T). To find the effect of the
policy on the outcome variable y, we can subtract
the average outcome value before the policy tak-
ing effect from that after the event for the treatment
group, that is, yT ,After − yT ,Before.
This difference gives the change in the average
outcome variable during the event window. How-
ever, other variables that affect the outcome vari-
able, such as macroeconomic conditions, may also
change during the event window. Therefore, we
need a control group (denoted by C) to account
for these other common shocks that affect y. Thus,
we subtract the average outcome before the event
from that after the event for the control group. This
difference gives us the counterfactual: Without the
treatment, how would the treated firms’ outcomes
change during the event window? The policy effect
can then be calculated by subtracting the difference
for the control group from that for the treatment
group, that is,
(







The double differences enable us to control for
the common shocks that can affect both groups.
8 See Meyer (1995) or Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a more
detailed exposition of the DD methodology.
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Thus, differencing in this manner eliminates biases
on the treatment group that may arise from any
common shock affecting both groups during the
event window.
Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004), our DD estimation equation for firm-
specific knowledge assets (FS) is as follows:
FSit = 𝛼t + 𝛼i+𝛽Takeover_ protectionit + 𝛾Xit + 𝜀it,
where i indexes firm and t indexes year. FSit,
the dependent variable of interest, is the level
of firm-specific knowledge assets. Takeover_
protection is a dummy variable equal to 1 if (1)
the year is greater than or equal to 1996 and (2)
the company is incorporated in Delaware; and 0 if
otherwise. Xit is a vector of control variables. 𝛼i and
𝛼t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. The
coefficient 𝛽 is the DD estimator, measuring the
effect of an increase in takeover protection. In the
extended model, we added to the above equation
the interaction term between managerial ownership
and takeover protection, and that between manage-
rial tenure and takeover protection, respectively, in
order to test Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Following prior studies (e.g., Low, 2009), we
winsorized all continuous variables at one percent
for both tails to mitigate the influence of outliers.
Also consistent with prior studies (e.g., Bertrand
et al., 2004), we adjusted our standard errors by
clustering the observations at the state of incorpora-
tion level to accounts for arbitrary correlation across
firms incorporated in the same state, as well as serial
correlation within the same firm.
Following Bertrand et al. (2004), all models were
estimated by OLS with firm fixed effects. We used
firm fixed effects instead of random effects models
for two reasons. First, fixed effects models, which
require weaker distribution assumptions, are con-
sidered to provide more robust estimations (e.g.,
Cameron and PK. Trivedi, 2005). In fact, most
studies employing the DD method used the fixed
effects models (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2003; Low, 2009; Yun, 2009). Second, we con-
ducted a Hausman test, and it showed that the fixed
effects models were more appropriate than random
effects models for our setting.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the
key variables for our sample. The mean value of
firm-specific knowledge based on the share mea-
sure is 3.55, and that based on the count measure is
0.93. As expected, the two measures of firm-specific
knowledge resource are highly correlated with a
coefficient of 0.52. Moreover, both measures are
significantly and positively correlated with takeover
protection, cash holdings, market to book ratio, and
managerial options. On the other hand, they are neg-
atively correlated with return on assets.
Table 2 presents the empirical results of the
models using the degree (or share-based) measure
of firm-specific knowledge assets. The standard
errors were clustered at the state of incorporation
level. The coefficients for the takeover protection
dummy variable indicate the effect of the Delaware
takeover regime shift on firm-specific knowledge
accumulation, which is one of the main interests of
the current study.
In Model 1, we included the control variables
only. We found that firm aspiration is negatively
and significantly associated with the share-based
measure of firm-specific knowledge. The estimated
coefficients on the control variables also indi-
cates that more profitable firms, older firms, and
firms whose CEOs had longer managerial tenure
have higher firm-specific knowledge. The effects
of some other variables, including financial lever-
age, firm size, and R&D intensity, are statistically
insignificant.9
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), in
Model 2, we included only the takeover protec-
tion variable. We found its coefficient to be positive
and significant. In Model 3, we included takeover
protection and other control variables, and again
found the coefficient of the takeover protection to
be positive and significant (p= 0.025). Regarding
its economic significance, a coefficient of 0.542 rep-
resents a 15.3 percent increase in the mean degree
of firm-specific knowledge assets in response to the
change in takeover protection. The findings strongly
support Hypothesis 1.
We further investigated the moderating effect of
managerial ownership in Model 4. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2, the interaction term is significant
and positive, indicating that the firms with higher
managerial ownership are more likely to increase
their levels of firm-specific knowledge as a result
9 This is not too surprising because it is generally more difficult
to find significant results with firm-fixed effects estimations,
as such models explore only within firm variation but exclude
cross-sectional variation.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix







3 Takeover protection 0.27 0.44 0.07 0.20
4 Cash holdings 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.35 0.09
5 Performance relative to
aspiration
0.00 0.06 −0.05 −0.02 −0.05 −0.07
6 Financial leverage 0.20 0.13 0.01 −0.16 0.10 −0.42 −0.01
7 Return on assets 0.16 0.10 −0.07 −0.13 −0.07 −0.25 0.31 −0.09
8 Market to book ratio 2.38 1.63 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.42 0.04 −0.30 0.22
9 R&D intensity 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.35 0.07 0.63 −0.11 −0.33 −0.36 0.37
10 Firm age 29.68 15.55 0.01 −0.24 −0.08 −0.53 0.06 0.31 0.14 −0.18 −0.42
11 Firm size 7.48 1.53 −0.04 −0.20 0.00 −0.44 0.05 0.29 0.28 −0.10 −0.38 0.63
12 Managerial ownership (%) 6.52 8.63 0.03 0.05 −0.01 0.06 −0.04 −0.14 −0.06 0.05 0.03 −0.34 −0.39
13 Managerial options 2.18 2.34 0.07 0.23 0.16 0.35 −0.12 −0.08 −0.34 0.08 0.39 −0.38 −0.53 0.15
14 Managerial tenure 19.41 12.37 0.04 −0.15 −0.01 −0.35 0.03 0.14 0.13 −0.12 −0.36 0.44 0.39 −0.02 −0.27
n= 1,396.
Correlations larger than 0.05 are significant at the level of p< 0.05 and those larger than 0.07 are significant at the level of p< 0.01.
of stronger takeover protection. To understand the
practical implication of this significant interaction,
we computed the high and low values of managerial
ownership by adding and subtracting half standard
deviation10 from its mean, which are 10.84 and
2.21, respectively. At the high value of managerial
ownership (10.84), the effect of takeover protection
was 1.03 (= –0.097+ 10.84× 0.104), represent-
ing a 29.0 percent increase in the mean degree
of firm-specific knowledge assets in response
to change in takeover protection. This effect
became 0.13 at low value of managerial ownership
(2.21), representing only a 3.7 percent increase in
firm-specific knowledge assets.
In Model 5, the interaction term between man-
agerial tenure and takeover protection was entered.
As expected, the term is significant and negative,
suggesting that the firms with CEOs having a
longer tenure are less likely to increase their levels
of firm-specific knowledge with stronger takeover
protection. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3.
Again, we computed the high and low values of the
managerial tenure by adding and subtracting half
standard deviation from its mean. At the high value
of managerial tenure (25.60), the effect of takeover
protection was 0.46 (= 1+ 25.60× (–0.021))
10 Since the standard deviation for managerial ownership is high,
subtracting 1 standard deviation from the mean would make the
low value negative. Therefore, we use 0.5 standard deviation to
calculate the high and low values.
, representing a 13.0 percent increase in the
mean degree of firm-specific knowledge assets in
response to change in takeover protection. The
effect became 0.72 at low value of managerial
tenure (13.23), representing a 20.3 percent increase
in firm-specific knowledge. Finally, we included all
variables in Model 5 and found results consistent
with those in partial estimations.
Figure 1 shows the moderating effects of man-
agerial ownership and CEO organizational tenure.
Please note that due to our use of differences-in-
differences (DD) methodology, the figure is dif-
ferent from typical two-way interaction graphs
(Younge, Tong, and Fleming, 2015).11 In par-
ticular, the horizontal axis in Figure 1 is the
moderating variable (managerial ownership and
organizational tenure of top managers, respec-
tively), while the vertical axis is the DD effect,
or change in dependent variable before and after
takeover law shifts. The magnitude of the DD effect
and the confidence-intervals are calculated using the
estimated coefficients and standard errors. Consis-
tent with Hypothesis 2, which states that managerial
ownership strengthens the effect of takeover pro-
tection on firm-specific knowledge, Graph 1 in
Figure 1 reveals that the DD effect, or the change
in firm-specific knowledge assets after takeover
11 Please see Younge et al. (2015) for a similar graph also based
on DD approach.
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Table 2. Takeover protection and firm knowledge accumulation strategy (DV: firm-specific knowledge using share-based
measure)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash holdings 1.231 1.363 1.788* 1.438 1.855*
(1.057) (1.073) (1.021) (1.040) (0.994)
Performance relative to
aspiration
−3.543** −3.428** −3.511*** −3.360*** −3.447**
(1.130) (1.198) (1.254) (1.191) (1.249)
Financial leverage 1.768 1.681 1.795 1.677 1.791
(1.855) (1.855) (1.859) (1.858) (1.861)
Return on assets 2.658** 2.647** 3.178** 2.576** 3.109**
(1.120) (1.167) (1.286) (1.154) (1.275)
Market to book ratio 0.146* 0.144* 0.162* 0.146* 0.164*
(0.083) (0.082) (0.089) (0.083) (0.089)
R&D intensity 0.207 0.347 0.651 0.429 0.725
(1.577) (1.550) (1.555) (1.538) (1.540)
Firm age 0.158*** 0.121** 0.125** 0.125** 0.129**
(0.033) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049)
Firm size 0.019 −0.017 −0.039 −0.052 −0.071
(0.179) (0.167) (0.170) (0.174) (0.177)
Managerial ownership 0.017 0.017 −0.004 0.018 −0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Managerial options 0.018 0.010 −0.012 0.002 −0.020
(0.080) (0.082) (0.075) (0.080) (0.073)
Managerial tenure 0.023** 0.023** 0.019* 0.030** 0.026**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Takeover protection 0.588** 0.542** −0.097 1.000*** 0.335











Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396
R-squared 0.751 0.748 0.751 0.756 0.752 0.756
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significant at the *p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01 level.
protection, becomes greater with an increase
in managerial ownership. Also consistent with
Hypothesis 3, Graph 2 indicates that the DD
effect, or the effect of takeover protection on firm-
specific knowledge, is weaker for firms with longer
managerial tenures.
We repeated the analyses in Table 3 using
the absolute-level (or count-based) measure of
firm-specific knowledge and obtained similar
results. Specifically, Models 2 and 3 show that
there is a statistically and economically significant
increase in the level of firm-specific knowledge
following an increase in takeover protection. The
coefficient of 0.232 represents a 25.0 percent
increase in the mean level of firm-specific knowl-
edge assets in response to the increase in takeover
protection. In Models 4–6, the interaction term
between takeover protection and managerial
ownership and that between takeover protection
and managerial tenure are significant with the
expected signs, indicating that the increase in
firm-specific knowledge with takeover protection is
more pronounced for firms with higher managerial
ownership but lower managerial tenure. These
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 2393–2412 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/smj






































































































Figure 1. Moderating roles of managerial ownership and tenure in the effect of takeover protection on firm-specific
knowledge (share-based measurea). aSimilar patterns of graphs (not shown here) are observed for count-based measure of
firm-specific knowledge
results again provide support for all the three
hypotheses.
Robustness tests
We conducted a number of other tests to ensure
the robustness of the empirical findings. First,
while in the main analyses we use share- and
count-based measures to proxy for firm-specific
knowledge assets, we ran additional tests using
unweighted measures of firm-specific knowledge
assets (e.g., Wang and Chen, 2010). In addition,
as the count-based measure of firm-specific knowl-
edge is skewed, we conducted sensitivity tests by
taking the logarithm transformation of this mea-
sure. Our results are not sensitive to either exclu-
sion of the weight or logarithm transformation of
the count-based measure.
In another robustness test, we replace manage-
rial ownership and executive option variable with
an index variable capturing both components, that
is, CEO pay for performance sensitivity (PPS).
PPS captures incentives induced by both stock and
option holdings of the CEO. It is defined as the dol-
lar change in CEO stock and option portfolio for a
$1,000 change in firm value, and is calculated as the
executive’s fractional equity ownership ([number
of shares held+ number of options held× average
option delta]/[number of shares outstanding]) mul-
tiplied by 1,000. We again find our main results
remain robust with this measure.
We also found similar key results when we
lagged the independent and control variables in
the models by one year. In the main analyses,
although we defined all Delaware-incorporated
firms in our sample as the treatment group (e.g.,
Low, 2009; Yun, 2009), Delaware-incorporated
firms with staggered boards were mostly affected
by the legislation. Thus, in an alternative specifi-
cation, following Kacperczyk (2009), we defined
Delaware-incorporated firms with staggered boards
as the treatment group. Specifically, the takeover
protection variable is defined as a dummy variable
equal to 1 if (1) the year is 1996 or later, (2) the
company was incorporated in Delaware, and (3) the
company has a staggered board; otherwise, it is 0.
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Table 3. Takeover protection and firm knowledge accumulation strategy (DV: firm-specific knowledge using count-based
measure)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash holdings 0.191 0.247 0.292* 0.281 0.323*
(0.171) (0.163) (0.168) (0.184) (0.189)
Performance relative to aspiration −0.219 −0.170 −0.179 −0.140 −0.149
(0.185) (0.183) (0.183) (0.182) (0.182)
Financial leverage 0.133 0.096 0.108 0.094 0.105
(0.308) (0.309) (0.310) (0.310) (0.310)
Return on assets 0.249 0.244 0.300 0.213 0.267
(0.441) (0.433) (0.414) (0.443) (0.425)
Market to book ratio 0.043* 0.042* 0.044* 0.043* 0.045*
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
R&D intensity −0.392 −0.332 −0.300 −0.295 −0.265
(0.792) (0.872) (0.861) (0.878) (0.868)
Firm age 0.066*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.053***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Firm size −0.045 −0.061 −0.063 −0.076 −0.078
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.068) (0.068)
Managerial ownership 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Managerial options −0.005 −0.008 −0.011 −0.012 −0.014
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Managerial tenure 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Takeover protection 0.225*** 0.232*** 0.165** 0.436*** 0.368***
(0.042) (0.048) (0.049) (0.066) (0.068)
Takeover protection×managerial ownership 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001)
Takeover protection×managerial tenure −0.009*** −0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396
R-squared 0.849 0.850 0.851 0.852 0.853 0.854
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significant at the *p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01 level.
We repeated the analyses using this new definition
of takeover protection and obtained consistent
results.12
While we have tried our best to show that the
observed relationships are channeled through
changes in managerial incentives, we are also
aware of the existence of alternative explanations.
For example, it may be argued that an increase in
takeover protection affects product market com-
petition, which, in turn, affects firms’ knowledge
accumulation patterns. To specifically address this
concern, we have examined whether there is a
significant change in product market competition
(based on several measures, including four-firm
12 Detailed results of these robustness tests are available from the
authors upon request.
concentration ratio, sales-based, and asset-based
Herfindahl-indexes) as a result of changes in
takeover protection. We compared these measures
before and after 1996 (also with the control group).
However, we found no significant changes in these
measures.
In some other tests, we have included addi-
tional control variables. For example, some other
firm-level or top manager-related factors could also
affect a firm’s change in their knowledge structure.
These factors may include firm age, CEO compen-
sation level, board related variables such as board
size and board independence, to name a few. In
addition, in comparing Delaware and non-Delaware
firms in our sample, we found that Delaware firms
are more leveraged and have lower returns on assets
(ROA) than non-Delaware firms. In the robustness
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tests, we controlled for firm leverage and ROA in
our regressions. In alternative specifications, we
also controlled for variables that could conceiv-
ably affect the decision of a firm to incorporate in
Delaware, such as firm age and Tobin’s Q (Daines,
2001; Subramanian, 2004). We found that the inclu-
sion of these variables in the regressions did not
change our key results. Therefore, we do not think
endogeneity of incorporation is a major concern in
our study.
We also added employee-level control variables
in some additional robustness tests. It might be
argued that in addition to top managers, key knowl-
edge employees and their incentives also play
important roles in a firm’s process of accumulating
firm-specific knowledge. To acknowledge the
role of employees in the process, we added two
employee-level control variables that are thought
to affect employee incentives to accumulate
firm-specific knowledge: employee equity own-
ership and firm-employee relationship. Employee
stock ownership is considered particularly relevant
to inducing employee effort to acquire firm-specific
knowledge, since equity ownership provides key
employees greater power to bargain ex post over
the economic rents generated from the deployment
of firm-specific knowledge assets (Wang et al.,
2009).13 Since employees’ concerns about holdup
by the firm may be based on perceptions that the
firm is in a position to unfairly expropriate their
investments in firm-specific human capital, the
firm’s efforts to build trust may help reduce the
threat of such perceptions. We thus expect that
firm-employee relationships, as a proxy for the trust
between a firm and its employees, may also affect
employee incentives to accumulate firm-specific
knowledge Firm-employee relationship infor-
mation is obtained from the KLD data.14 After
controlling for the effects of these employee-level
13 Employee ownership is measured in terms of the percentage of
beneficial ownership of the firm’s common stock held by employ-
ees as a collective. Information on employee stock ownership
was collected from the SEC data. The SEC requires every reg-
istered firm to file a definitive proxy statement (DEF14-A) annu-
ally, which discloses the beneficial ownership of common stock
holdings in excess of five percent. Note that for firms in which
employees’ collective shareholdings are below five percent, this
information is not reported and was thus coded as 0.
14 The data have been used to compile profiles and social rat-
ings evaluating each company’s strengths and concerns in several
, including community, diversity, firm-employee relations, envi-
ronment, products, and so forth. We obtained our firm-employee
relationship measure from the “employee relations” dimension of
the KLD data.
variables, we still found significant support for our
hypotheses, while both of the coefficients on the
two employee variables are insignificant.
We conducted alternative analyses to ensure that
our main results are robust. First, we examined
different post-legislation windows. Since a time
lag may exist between firms’ strategic shift toward
firm-specific knowledge accumulation and patent
application, we also used the second year (1997)
and third year (1998) after the legislation as the
starting year for the post-legislation window. In
other words, the four years before legislation were
taken from the period of 1992 to 1995, and the
four years after legislation were from 1997 to 2000
and from 1998 to 2001, respectively. Second, we
conducted additional tests by applying a matching
approach. In particular, we match Delaware incor-
porated firms with other firms using the coarsened
exact matching (CEM) approach, based on firm
size and market to book ratio, as these covariates
have been shown in previous studies as the main
factors that affect the firm’s decision to incorpo-
rate in Delaware (Subramanian, 2002). We then run
regressions using the matched sample. Our results
remained robust across these different approaches.
Finally, while our current clustering is done at
the state level, we applied alternative clustering
approaches. In particular, we have clustered the
standard errors at the firm level to account for serial
correlation within the same firm and found that the
main results remain significant. In addition, we have
conducted a two-way cluster (both at the firm and at
the year level) (Cameron and Miller, 2013) and have
again found robust results.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this study, we argue that with an exogenous
increase in takeover protection, top managers are
more willing to acquire specialized managerial
skills, and accordingly, adopt a firm strategy
of accumulating a higher level of firm-specific
knowledge assets. Our empirical analyses strongly
support this argument. Following an increase in
takeover protection, there is an increase in firm
specific knowledge in terms of both the degree
of firm-specificity in a firm’s knowledge and the
absolute level of firm-specific knowledge asset
stock. Moreover, managerial ownership positively
moderates this relationship. That is, firms with
higher levels of managerial ownership are found to
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 2393–2412 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
2408 H. Wang, S. Zhao, and J. He
have a bigger increase in firm-specific knowledge
resources following an increase in takeover protec-
tion. In contrast, firms with top managers having
longer organizational tenure are less likely to be
influenced in their firm-specific knowledge assets
following an increase in takeover protection.
The present study contributes to the corporate
governance literature in general and the takeover
literature in particular. First, it echoes Shleifer and
Summers (1988) and Hanley (1992) to suggest that
takeover threats increase managerial concern about
job security and about the loss of firm-specific
managerial human capital. As a result, the presence
of takeover threats reduces mangers’ incentives to
adopt a strategy toward accumulating and deploy-
ing a higher level of firm-specific knowledge.
Second, the present study builds on Jensen and
colleagues (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Ruback,
1983) to address the other side of the story, that is,
takeover protection also eliminates the disciplinary
role of the takeover threat. In particular, although
takeover protection lessens managerial concerns
for acquiring firm-specific skills, it may also lead to
other forms of misbehavior and reduced managerial
efforts in general. Thus, a complementary internal
incentive mechanism such as managerial owner-
ship should be implemented jointly with takeover
protection to best direct managers toward strategies
that can help maximize firm value. By inference,
this study suggests a contingent approach to
understanding the role of takeovers by highlighting
the conditioning effects of a firm’s knowledge
resource composition and managerial ownership.
We hope that this study can help reconcile some of
the controversies over whether and to what extent
the market for corporate control functions as an
effective governance mechanism (see Dalton et al.
(2007) for a recent review).
The present study also makes several contri-
butions to the resource-based theory of the firm.
It extends the theory by highlight how external
factors may affect managerial incentives to fully
realize firm resources’ rent-generating potential.
Although the resource-based theory emphasizes the
role of firm-specific resources in enabling a firm
to achieve superior financial performance (Barney,
1991; Peteraf, 1993), relatively little attention15 has
15 Exceptions are Gottschalg and Zollo (2007), Makadok (2003),
and Wang et al. (2009), who maintain that accurately predicting
firm performance requires resource-based research not to over-
look governance mechanisms.
been given to managers’ willingness and the gov-
ernance mechanisms that may influence the accu-
mulation of firm-specific resources. We argue that
the features of firm-specific (knowledge) resources
that constitute potential performance advantages
are simultaneously likely to give rise to concerns in
managers’ incentives to invest in specialized man-
agerial skills. Without incorporating these manage-
rial incentives issues into the resource-based analy-
sis, we may not have a complete understanding of
the origin of firm-specific resources and their real
potential for performance advantage.
Our theoretical focus on the role of managerial
incentives in firm knowledge accumulation and
deployment also adds two important understand-
ings with regard to firm resources. First, previous
studies on managerial resources (Castanias and
Helfat, 1991, 2001; Wulf and Singh, 2011) gen-
erally viewed managerial firm-specific skills per
se, as a potential rent-generating resource of firms.
Yet we view those skills as a complementary
resource that needs to be combined with firms’
specific knowledge to generate rents or superior
performance for the firm. This is why managerial
incentives become critical for the generation of
resource-based advantages. Viewed this way, top
managers’ firm-specific skills will be determined
not only by managers’ age and tenure (Murphy and
Zabojnik, 2007), but also by the firm’s knowledge
asset structure (e.g., its firm-specificity). Second,
while previous studies typically view a firm’s stock
of firm-specific knowledge as a given, we consider
it as the result of firm knowledge accumulation
strategy, and discuss how managerial incentives
affect the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge
in the first place. Therefore, our study is in keeping
with the proposal that resource-based research
needs to tap into the origin and antecedents of
critical firm resources and capabilities (Dierickx
and Cool, 1989; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Lacetera,
Cockburn, and Henderson, 2004). To our best
knowledge, this is one of the first studies examining
such an issue in empirical contexts.
Another contribution of the current study is in
terms of methodology. We are able to apply the DD
methodology to compare the effects of antitakeover
legislation on different groups of firms using the
Delaware antitakeover legislation as a natural
experiment. This approach has several advantages
over a typical cross-sectional approach. First, the
adoption of the law is exogenous to our variables
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of interest.16 Hence, there is little concern about
selection biases. Second, we were able to control
for other contemporaneous factors and trends in the
outcomes (Meyer, 1995) by using the firms incor-
porated in the states that do not increase takeover
protection as the control group. The double dif-
ferences enabled us to control for common shocks
that could affect both groups. Thus, examining
the differences in this manner eliminates biases on
the treatment group that may arise from any other
common changes during the event window.
Despite these potential contributions, the study
also has some limitations that provide opportu-
nities for future research. First, to formulate our
theoretical predictions, we focused mainly on the
incentives of top managers. Although top managers
are structurally influential in both adopting and
implementing strategies related to firm-specific
knowledge assets, the role of critical employees
such as key knowledge workers is also important
for a firm to achieve resource-based advantages.
Therefore, other employees’ motivation and gover-
nance also deserve a systematic examination. Given
their lack of bargaining power, the concerns of
employees in making specific investments are likely
to be even stronger than those of the top managers.
And, the governance of key technical employees in
firms operating in high-tech, knowledge-intensive
environments may be particularly important (Wang
et al., 2009). Further, investigating the condi-
tions under which executive-level incentives and
nonexecutive-level employee incentives may inter-
act to influence firm strategy and resource-based
performance advantages would also be promising
for future research.
Second, the current study mainly examines the
role of takeover protection in influencing top man-
agers’ decisions toward accumulating firm-specific
knowledge and considers the interactive effect
between takeover protection and managerial own-
ership. However, some other corporate governance
factors may also affect top managers’ motivations
to acquire specialized managerial skills. Although
we are unable to directly incorporate these alter-
native mechanisms in this study, future research
can take into consideration a broader range of
governance or motivating mechanisms.
Other limitations come from data- and
measurement-related issues. First, although patent
16 For further discussion of the endogeneity issue of antitakeover
laws, see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Rauh (2006).
data provide rich information about the path of
knowledge creation and flow, they only encom-
pass one type of organizational knowledge. This
condition leads to some inherent limitations that
may question the validity of our measurement of
firm-specific knowledge and constrain the inter-
pretation of our regression results. Future research
may consider using survey or other field data to
explore organizational knowledge and its degree of
firm specificity more broadly by including other
nonpatented knowledge assets.
In this article, through the lens of firm knowledge
strategy, we integrate the corporate governance and
resource-based theory of the firm literatures to show
how they jointly provide a better understanding of
the effects of market for corporate control. In par-
ticular, we examine how an increase in takeover
protection affects a firm’s strategic shift toward
the accumulation of a higher level of firm-specific
knowledge assets. More generally, this study high-
lights the importance of human factors in gen-
erating competitive advantage from firm-specific
resources, which is in accordance with some other
recent efforts examining the roles that managers
and employees play in obtaining and developing
firm resources (e.g., He and Wang, 2009; Wang
et al., 2009) and dynamic capabilities (Helfat and
Peteraf, 2003; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Our
study also shares the vision of a line of research
that emphasizes the role of resource orchestration
in realizing a resource-based competitive advantage
(e.g., Sirmon and Hitt, 2009; Sirmon, Hitt, and Ire-
land, 2007). It can be considered complementary to
this line of research to provide a better understand-
ing of the origin of firm resources, capabilities, and
resource-based competitive advantages.
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